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Abstract 
The Netherlands does not have the smoothest political climate as one might expect. With 
the parliamentary system in place with party list proportional representation, it is very 
difficult for a single political party to obtain the majority of seats in the House of 
Representatives. Leading to a coalition government. In order for the coalition to 
function, a coalition agreement is written out at every coalition’s start and considered as 
the first political agenda of this newly formed government. However, this agenda is 
highly subject to change and with yearly updates of this agenda through executive 
speeches, the attention allocation as set out at the beginning is not always adhered to. 
This leads to differentiating levels of correspondence between the coalition agreement 
and the executive speeches. This thesis continues with previous research by analysing 
the correlation of these political agendas and looking at the possible application of the 
Political Business Cycle theory. This theory believes that every government will 
manipulate the economy through their policies to yield the best possible results for the 
next elections. If applied successfully, it should be visible in the correlations. Throughout 
this thesis it will be investigated whether the Political Business Cycle is possible in a 
country with a government structure as in the Netherlands. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
‘It’s perfectly reasonable in a coalition between two political parties that you get 
supporters of those parties you know stressing the things they want to stress.’  
 
– George Osborne, British MP 
 
  
For some centuries since their self-declared independence from Habsburg Spain, the 
Dutch have had multiple experiences with various forms of governance. Until the late 
19th century, Dutch politics was not familiar with the concept of established political 
parties. Around this time, the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Catholic party 
cooperated for the common goal of government funding for all types of school. This was 
a turning point in Dutch governance. Since then, coalition governments have been at the 
heart of Dutch politics. After the second World War, all Dutch governments have existed 
in coalitions. 
 From 1963 onwards, all Dutch governments have drafted and published a 
coalition agreement. Coalition agreements concluded between the political parties were 
not made public before 1963. But before a coalition agreement is finalised and 
presented to the Dutch public, an elaborate and often lengthy process unwinds first: the 
government formation. During these formation talks the political parties which are 
likely to form a coalition are prodded by the ‘informateur’ and have many long meetings 
and discussions. The formation process after the 2017 elections shows what a lengthy 
process it can be. The reasoning behind a coalition agreement is that it supposedly 
reduces uncertainty, remove or manage possible conflicts and strengthen the 
partnership ( Timmermans & Breeman, 2015). Often during these times, those topics 
which are central to the parties involved are discussed  and generally result in certain 
major topics constituting as key elements of the agreement. 
 What follows are often extensive documents. They detail how to tackle certain 
policy disputes but also function as an important agenda setting tool. Nevertheless, there 
are also governments which decide to not make a big fuss about the coalition 
agreements and attempt to keep it as simple and clean as possible. But having a coalition 
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agreement, does not mean it is always easy to prioritise policy problems at the 
beginning of a coalition’s time in office. This can be partially attributed to the ideologies 
of the political parties involved. Even when they are closely aligned on the political scale, 
all parties in the coalition need to be in agreement up to a certain level while balancing 
the agenda. This all in order for the coalition to function properly. It is not always aided 
by the continuous pressure to change the conditions and update the policy agenda, 
emanating from internal and external forces. It is therefore not uncommon to observe 
agenda shuffles during a cabinet’s time in office. 
 Agenda (re)shuffles are a very common occurrence in the Netherlands. Previous 
research even observed a pattern in the agenda setting and attention allocation of the 
government. Even though a coalition agreement is an understanding between the 
coalition partners about how and which issues are tackled and how much attention is 
given to these issues, this detected trend demonstrates that Dutch governments do not 
stick to this attention allocation. Or at least not in the beginning of their term. More 
often, a government drifts away in the first year while moving back to the coalition 
agreement in the second and third year. (Timmermans & Breeman, 2014). 
  It has been established that the pattern is present up until the Balkenende-IV 
government. This research will look at the attention allocation of policy issues in the 
agenda of the Rutte-II government and its relation to the coalition agreement. The 
expectation is a break with the pattern, due to the political conditions the Rutte-II 
government had to deal with. A coalition agreement is seen as the ‘political truth’ of 
Dutch governments during their time in office and is seen as leading in the attention 
allocation for the political agenda at the beginning of a government’s administration.  
 In order to verify that the pattern is discontinued in the agenda setting of this 
cabinet, I will use the Executive Speeches, ‘Troonredes’ in Dutch, to compare and 
contrast the attention allocation and determine the level of correspondence. The 
argument for using the ‘Troonredes’ is that it is a yearly, executive speech given by the 
Dutch monarch in which the government’s plans and proposed agenda for the next 
twelve months is presented. This is also seen as the start of a cabinet’s work year. 
Because the coalition agreement is discussed, formed and shaped at the start of a 
government’s term and the document itself not subject to change afterwards, the yearly 
executive speeches are an indicator of the policy agenda and attention allocation shifts. 
Next to that, this thesis will look at the theory of the Political Business Cycle and 
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whether or not its application occurs or has occurred within the Dutch government 
structure. The Political Business Cycle emanated from Anglo-Saxon countries but so far 
it has not been tested whether it was applied in countries with a coalition governance 
like the Netherlands. 
 
 
1.1 - Research question and hypothesis 
 
Up until now, previous research has focused on the attention allocation and agenda drift 
of Dutch cabinets until 2007/2010. This thesis will focus on the Rutte-II government and 
poses the following question:  
 
To what extent did the Rutte-II government stick to the allocation of attention to policy 
problems as decided upon in the coalition agreement and what is the influence of the 
Political Business Cycle? 
 
 By using collected data on the coalition agreements and the Executive Speeches 
and by comparing the political agenda of the coalition agreement with the agenda of the 
executive speeches, we will be able to get a thorough view whether the attention 
allocation matches up. Based on the research question and the literature, I ask the 
following sub-questions: 
1. How is the attention allocated in the 2012 coalition agreement?; 
2. Are there significant variations percentage wise in the 2012 attention allocation 
in the main topics compared to previous governments?; 
3. Is there agenda drift or agenda correspondence of the coalition agreement in 
comparison with the executive speeches? 
4. What is the pattern of the agenda correspondence/agenda drift in the political 
agenda of cabinet Rutte-II 
5. Did cabinet Rutte-II and previous cabinets make use of the Political Business 
Cycle? 
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The first sub-question will look at the attention allocation of the current cabinet’s 
coalition agreement in order to determine the initial political agenda. It is necessary to 
ascertain the attention allocation of the coalition agreement, otherwise it will be difficult 
to corroborate part of the premise of this research. The second sub-question will check 
whether there are changes or variations in the attention allocation in comparison with 
previous governments. This will not only assist in checking the possible changes but also 
whether there is a shift in the main topics. Another purpose of this sub-question is to 
determine if the current government follows the same dynamic as previous 
governments regarding the attention allocation. The third sub-question will determine 
whether there is agenda drift or agenda correspondence when comparing the attention 
allocation of the coalition agreement as set out in the first sub-question with the 
attention allocation in the yearly executive speeches. The fourth sub-question will then 
look at the pattern of agenda drift or agenda correspondence in order to establish the 
agenda pattern of cabinet Rutte-II. This will help in answering the main research 
question of this thesis. Sub-question two, three and four will also delve into the top five 
of the topics in both the coalition agreement as well as the executive speeches next to 
the overall attention allocation. 
Sub-question five is posed to ascertain whether Dutch coalitions in the past have 
made use of the Political Business Cycle (PBC) in order to yield better impressions when 
voters are deciding on their voting behaviour. But due to the increasingly polarising 
Dutch society, the surge of political parties and the boost in prominence of previously 
deemed smaller issues, the expectation is that the current government has not been able 
to make much use of the PBC. I will also look into if previous governments show signs of 
a possible Political Business Cycle.  
The expectation is that the pattern (drift in 1st year, moving closer to  coalition 
agreement in 2nd and 3rd year) as established in previous research will not be continued. 
The results of sub-questions two and three will be used in order to answer the fifth sub-
question. Sub-questions two, three and four may give insight into the utilisation of the 
PBC in Dutch governance. Throughout this research I will also look into the kind of 
issues and which of these obtained more and less attention. By looking only at one 
cabinet, I can specifically focus in depth on the topics as well and thus argue more 
substantially about the application and effects of the Political Business Cycle by the 
Rutte – II government 
8/71 
 
 
 
Based on these sub-questions I present the following expectation: 
 
H1:  Instead of following the pattern found in previous research the Rutte-II government 
has broken with this pattern while the Political Business Cycle did not influence the 
political agenda. 
 
H1 argues that the pattern found in previous research by Timmermans and 
Breeman (2010) and Mortensen et al. (2011), where it has been established that agenda 
shifts occur most often in the beginning of a term, is no longer present with the second 
government of prime minister Rutte. Also, from the Balkenende cabinets onwards, the 
correlation decreased over the years, showing a pattern of not sticking to the main 
topics during these governments’ terms. This hypothesis will also look at the usage of 
the Political Business Cycle by Dutch governments. The general principal of this theory 
is that more salient issues will be implemented first to leave the more agreeable and less 
conflicting issues for the final year and just in time for the next elections. I wonder 
whether this type of theory works and is applicable in a government structure as in the 
Netherlands, as this has not been tested before, but expect that it will either not work or 
the data will show no conclusive results. 
 The manifestation of agenda drift in the beginning of a government’s term in 
office while returning more and more to the coalition agreement in the following years 
is explained by Bertelli and John (2014) as the prioritisation of the problems by 
monitoring public opinion and systematic calculation of public policy investments. In 
many cases, when using the PBC, governments prefer to first tackle the thorny issues 
while they are still in the beginning of their term and leave the issues considered to be 
easier for their last year around the start of campaigning for the upcoming elections. 
However, this is more difficult to plan appropriately, seeing how certain policy issues 
may arise ‘out of nowhere’ and have sometimes to be dealt with under less than ideal 
circumstances. Another argument in the literature is that ‘new’ governments are less 
inclined to changes in attention to policy issues compared to governments who are able 
to prolong their stay in office (Breeman et al., 2009). ‘New’ coalitions with a partial 
turnover would have less change in the attention allocation for major topics than those 
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governments which prolong their term completely unchanged. Because the make-up of 
the current government is also only a partial turnover, it may have led to little shifts in 
attention allocation for the major policy topics, despite the general belief that parties 
new in the government attempt to realise their election promises to the general 
expectation of their voters. In accordance to other literature, the agenda drift would only 
occur in the first year and perhaps in the fourth year when a coalition lasts that long. 
 However, the lack of success of a government to follow their initial policy agenda 
and attempt to tackle the more thorny issues at the beginning of their term and the less 
conflict-inducing issues in their final year has to do with the greater difficulty of using 
the Political Business Cycle. The PBC, specifically the opportunistic political business 
cycle, means that an incumbent political party will induce and expand economic activity 
just before election time. The idea behind this is that voters will look more favourably 
upon the incumbent party in the next election year, thus enlarging the chance of re-
election for said party. Nordhaus (1975) explains how households and individuals vote 
rationally, using past behaviour of political parties as a measuring tape of their 
expectations of political parties’ future behaviour and base their voting behaviour 
appropriately. Political parties are supposedly only interested in election outcomes and 
want to know the voters preferences as perfectly as possible in order to win these 
elections. It is therefore that the government chooses economic policies which will 
resonate in good results or experiences for the people, on which these individuals base 
their voting behaviour for the next election. While Nordhaus mainly uses economic 
policies, the theory of the Political Business Cycle  can also be applied on policies in 
different sectors which are deemed as important or connect the national economy with 
sectors like education, healthcare or social security/social affairs.  
 Although previous Dutch governments may have used PBC in their favour for re-
election purposes, I hypothesise that the PBC has not been used or that the data will not 
give any significant and conclusive results on the application of the PBC on the policy 
agenda. Dutch society appears to become increasingly polarised and fragmented, making 
it more difficult for political parties to know and align with the electorate’s preferences 
while also sticking to their party ideology. Next to that, there is a growing number of 
political parties, with a few rising to prominence in the last few years, such as the 
populist PVV, and the newly founded DENK and FvD, which all won seats in the last 
national elections. A multiparty system as we have in the Netherlands makes it hard to  
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(continue to) use the PBC. What subsequent voting polls before the elections predicted 
and the final results showed is that the coalition parties have lost seats while some of the 
opposition parties gained seats, with the PVV only in the last few weeks before the 2017 
elections dropping slightly in the polls (Peilingwijzer, 21 December 2016 and 12 March 
2017). As late as the end of February, only twenty-five percent of the electorate has 
made a decision who to vote for (NOS, 4 March 2017). The final results show that both 
former coalition parties lost seats, although the PvdA (Labour) much more compared to 
the VVD (Liberals), who still remained the biggest party. So this would already incline us 
to think that even if the PBC has been used by the last government, it has not been able 
to use the PBC enough to create a positive outcome. Or at least not for both political 
parties. Additionally, the PBC leans heavily on rational choice theory, in which both 
political parties and voters are seen as rational individuals. However, voters do not 
always behave rationally and there are usually more factors than just the economy 
which plays a part when deciding which party to vote for. The electorate can also be 
influenced by the media (re)presentation, thus playing on the rationale but also the 
emotions of voters. Finally, the PBC deals with the planning by incumbent political 
parties: how to plan their policies in such a way that the positive effects of some policies 
have enough weight and meaning to lead to the parties’ preferred election outcomes. 
Yet, a government’s strength also comes from their ability to adapt, adjust and react 
appropriately to changes and issues. When we look back at the last few years, many 
issues rose in prominence after the (yearly) political agenda was already presented and 
attention had to be diverted and reallocated to these new issues. A current example of 
not being able to stick to the attention allocation of the planned agenda is the debate and 
re-emergence of the Teeven affair, when it became known that the previous minister of 
Justice, Ard van der Steur, knew more than he had let on at first-hand about the issue 
which forced his predecessor to resign. Other examples in the Netherlands are debates 
on terrorism after terrorism attacks worldwide, earthquakes by gas depletion etc. 
Because the main focus is the Rutte-II government, I can explicitly look at shifts in 
attention allocation and which issues got re-allocated more, less or for the first time 
attention during this cabinet’s run. I will also look at what are seen as priority issues by 
this government. The application and possibility of the Political Business Cycle within 
Dutch political systems will be analysed as well. Due to the changing nature of political 
agendas, I will also investigate what caused some topics to receive less or no attention 
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and thus becoming ‘orphaned’ issues while others received more or anew attention, 
making them ‘adopted’ issues. 
1.2 – Theoretical and Practical Relevance 
 
This research will conduct theory testing by building further upon existing literature 
relating to coalition agreements, the attention allocation of political agendas and the 
Political Business Cycle. I will explicitly focus on cabinet Rutte-II and if it adheres to the 
same pattern as previous Dutch governments. The goal of this thesis is to analyse the 
attention allocation of the coalition agreement and the yearly executive speeches and 
investigate the level of correspondence between these two kinds of political agendas 
and the possibility of the Political Business Cycle in a coalition government structure. 
Earlier research has shown that there is an agenda drift from the political agenda as set 
out in the coalition agreement during a cabinet’s first year of incumbency. The PBC has 
thus far not been used to examine coalition governance structures. By testing existing 
theories and patterns and continuing on previous research, this thesis’ topic is of 
theoretical relevance. 
 In addition, I will not solely work with already published literature but I will also 
make use of different datasets containing the coalition agreements and the executive 
speeches. These datasets have already been coded according to the Dutch Codebook 
(Breeman & Timmermans, 2009), except for the coalition agreement of the 2012 
government. For the purpose of this research, I will code this coalition agreement 
according to the abovementioned codebook. This will be done in order to compare and 
contrast the coded content of the 2012 coalition agreement with previous coalition 
agreements and the executive speeches for the years 2013 – 2016, thus leading to more 
reliable findings. 
 I will make use of quantitative analyses to establish the agenda drift for this 
government and the value of the agenda drift in correspondence with the ‘Troonredes’ 
and the possible change in attention allocation regarding the main topics of the 
governments over the years. The results of these analyses will be used to answer the 
first sub-question and by comparing the previously coded date of other Dutch 
governments it provide answers to the second sub-question. In order to answer the 
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third sub-question I will compare the coded data of this coalition agreement with the 
coded date of the executive speeches of 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. 
 Finally,  this thesis also has a significant practical relevance. It will give further 
insights into coalition agreements and the drafting of these kinds of documents. Next to 
the fact that it will investigate pre-existing theories, it will allow for a better 
understanding of the political agendas of Dutch governments. By affirming certain 
coalition theories and prior findings and seeing how it relates to ‘real-life’ cases, we have 
a better grasp of the complications of political agendas and agenda shifts. Another 
attribute which I find interesting is if this government will divert from or continue to 
follow the identified trend, despite the fact that this coalition is not a very traditional one 
(Labour and Liberals without a ‘buffer’ party). This thesis also combines the theory of 
PBC with a more practical side. Namely if the PBC is applicable by a Dutch government, 
something which has not been researched before. In case the data shows that Dutch 
governments have potentially used the PBC successfully, it is important to further 
investigate to what extent this can be attributed to the PBC or whether other factors are 
played a key role. 
 
 
1.3 – Limitations to the validity and reliability 
 
Because my research is country specific, the results of this study cannot be generalised 
to other countries outside of the Netherlands, even though they possibly have the same 
governmental structure. This limits the external validity. What needs to be understood 
as well is that there is a difference between the functions of the coalition agreements 
and the executive speeches. So there will always be a difference in the attention 
allocation of the topics because the executive speech has a more external function. 
However, the research method can be used for other studies who wish to examine  
agenda correspondence. The results of this and previous research can be used to 
contrast and compare the findings of similar studies and add to the general 
understanding and insight of political agendas and agenda drift/agenda correspondence. 
In addition, while I mainly focus on the political agenda of one cabinet, it gives me the 
opportunity to thoroughly look into this cabinet and spend more attention on the topic 
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changes of the political agenda. Next to that I will investigate a political theory which has 
thus far not been checked against a coalition government structure but only against 
Anglo-Saxon model type of governments: the Political Business Cycle 
 What contributes to the reliability is that the last coalition agreement which I 
coded for the purpose of this research has been coded according to the Dutch Codebook 
as developed by Breemans and Timmermans (2009), which in turn was based on 
internationally recognised codebooks. Due to all executive speeches and coalition 
agreements up until 2012 being coded before and by two separate persons, it has a high 
inter-coder reliability. The 2012 agreement will be checked through sampling the 
number of units of analysis and if the samples are coded accordingly. 
 The internal validity of my research is limited by the idea that the expected break 
with the patterns, is partially due to the combination of these of these two political 
parties, VVD (liberal) and PvdA (labour), having never occurred without a ‘buffer’ 
coalition partner. This may possibly lead to a more difficult application of the PBC due to 
the fact that the political parties are not closely aligned in political views. Also, perhaps 
against all expectations, this government has completed its four year term. Something 
which has not occurred since the late 90’s. However, it will be difficult to attribute a 
potential break with the pattern solely to these factors. I will take into account in my 
analysis of the first and fifth sub-questions, where I look at the attention allocation of the 
2012 coalition agreement, compare this and the main topics with those of previous 
coalition agreements and question the use of the PBC by this government. If my 
hypotheses prove invalid, I will make use of these results for discussion and possible 
explanation. 
 This research further has high internal validity by way of the units of analysis and 
units of observation. My units of analysis are the coded statements of the coalition 
agreements, which are publically available after its presentation by the new cabinet. 
There is little bias because a shift in attention allocation is influenced by new policy 
issues or existing policy issues growing in importance while there is no selection bias. 
No coalition agreement since 1963 or executive speech have been left out of the 
quantitative analyses and there is less chance of systematic error due to the elimination 
of content without any inherent policy or topic reference. 
 Lastly, the dependent variable used in this thesis is the level of agenda 
correspondence. So is there a (big) drift from the political agenda as set out in the 
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coalition agreement or is the government sticking as much as possible to the attention 
allocation and the main/top priorities of the agenda? Officially, agenda drift and agenda 
correspondence measure the same thing: the extent of which the political agendas 
match up. 
 
 
1.4 – Reader’s guide 
 
I have divided this thesis in the following sections; in Chapter Two I will detail the 
existing literature on coalition formation and coalition agreement and how this fits into 
the theoretical framework. This will be followed by the definition of the key concepts 
used in this thesis and the dependent and independent variable. Chapter Three will 
detail the research design and the operationalisation of the key concepts. In Chapter 
Four I will present the results of the quantitative analysis and in Chapter Five I will 
further discuss my interpretations of the results against the reviewed literature and 
conclude whether or not the data shows clear signs of a Political Business Cycle, answer 
the fifth sub-question and write a final conclusion by answering the main research 
question and validating or disprove my hypothesis. 
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2 – Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In this chapter I will first describe and review the existing literature on this topic so the 
reader will have a thorough understanding of the theoretical basis and understand the 
scope of this research. After the literature review I will explain how this connects to the 
hypothesis. Finally I will explain the dependent and independent variables of this thesis  
and define and elaborate upon the key concepts as used in this study: coalition 
formation, coalition agreements, political agenda and attention allocation, and the 
executive speech: the ‘Troonrede’. Here I will also give a bit more background 
information on the concepts and the topic of this study in general and why these 
concepts are important in connection with the hypothesis and the variables. 
 
 
2.1 – Literature Review 
 
2.1.1 – The building and forming of coalitions 
In the years after WW-II, most of the first coalition theories were published. These 
theories had the premise that political parties are playing a coalition game with rational 
actors who are pursuing utility maximisation. Different scholars sought to answer the 
question of how particular combinations of political parties were to be more successful 
in forming coalition governments than others (Ştefuriuc, 2013). Game theory 
traditionally viewed political parties as unitary actors, whereas other studies placed 
more emphasis on policy aspects while having formation and duration of governments 
as their main focus. These often focus on the ideological distances between parties on 
the political scale and where they coalesce. However, Laver and Schofield (1990) 
mention how this is challenged by the European perspective. This approach options how 
there is a necessity to observe coalition formation beyond the political games of rational 
choice and utility maximisation and how different institutions have to be taken into 
account (Ştefuriuc). Connected to this is the realisation that in many parliamentary 
democracies in Europe, it is only rarely that a single party wins the marjority of 
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parliamentary seats (Müller, Bergman, & Strøm, 2008). As expected, government 
formation starts with the multiple political parties which have been given parliamentary 
seats as a direct result of the latest elections. This does not mean that political parties do 
not look ahead or anticipate the political future. Political parties attempt to act 
strategically, in order to win favour and sympathy among the electorate with the hope 
this will result in votes so they can either become part of the coalition or the opposition 
(Shepsle, 2010). There are different examples: being vocal about what makes them 
different from other political parties in what they definitely do or do not want to change 
and in what way; to make clear they do not want to form a coalition with certain political 
parties before election results are known; and even to create a tentative coalition policy 
agenda before the government formation process has officially started in order to assess 
real coalition possibilities. This especially applies to parties in a proportional 
representation system, where political parties appear to have to work harder for every 
seat in parliament. This ideally leads to high levels of government responsiveness, 
where the government aims to tackle and prioritise those issues close to the public’s 
preference when the situation allows it.  
Knowing that the Netherlands have a long experience with coalition 
governments, it is not strange that government formation plays such an important role. 
Ultimately resulting in a coalition: a cabinet in which multiple political parties cooperate 
with one another with a coalition agreement at the base of this collaboration. Multiple 
reasons and factors are taken into account during the discussing and making of a 
coalition agreement. Politicians understand how uncertain the (political) future can be 
and also how uncertain the behaviour of their political partners can be (Müller, 
Bergman, Strøm). It is for this reason that the formation process can often be a very 
lengthy process. Politicians spend much of their time and energy on negotiations to 
create a more politically stable environment, without losing sight of their parties’ goals 
and policy plans. The complexity of it shows with the current formation which is 
currently on its 128th day, third longest in Dutch coalition formation history. 
Coalition agreements can be either formal or informal and theoretically also be 
finalised during different stages of government formation. According to Luebbert (1986) 
and Timmermans and Breeman (2015), coalition agreements have as the ultimate goals 
to reduce the uncertainty with which politicians have to act and cooperate with one 
another, remove or mitigate conflict, and strengthen the teamwork. There are different 
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uncertainties which political parties aim to reduce when both parties consent to the 
agreement. For one, political parties have to identify their partners in government and 
the terms under which they would share the responsibility when taking office. Often this 
also includes who gets what, how the portfolios are divided among the ministers and 
parties. Previous experiences of cooperation and reputations of political parties can also 
play a vital role during formation time (Müller, Bergman, Strøm). This has happened the 
2017 election when many Dutch political parties proclaimed to exclude the PVV from 
any collaboration. Citing past experiences, such as branding the PVV as a party who 
walks away when it becomes too difficult or because of the reputation and rhetoric the 
party argues for, show that this is a factor. Past experiences are also of importance when 
deciding what will become part of the coalition agreement, which issues have to be put 
down on paper and be made official and which ones can be left out, sometimes 
purposefully so.  
While political parties appear to act strategically in order to govern, party leaders 
are believed to have limited capacity in accepting policy compromises and making policy 
concessions for the sake of participating in coalition government (Warwick, 2006). 
Warwick (2006) mentions that this is not too surprising, given that  “it is a well-
established fact that coalition governments tend to be formed of parties whose policy 
preferences are relatively similar” (p. ix). What follows is the ambition of leaders to 
accomplish policy commitments with congruent coalition partners. Warwick argues 
even further that political parties in the West European parliamentary system have 
‘distinct bounds’ on how far they can discard any policy commitment for the sake of a 
cabinet seat. These party bounds are named ‘policy horizons’, which surround the 
declared policy or ideological position of a political party. It implies that a party can 
consider proposals to form and partake in a government if the policy stance of the future 
government will fall within the bounds of that party’s policy horizon. Any other coalition 
possibilities with advantages for the party and its leaders extending beyond the set 
horizon are unlikely to be formed. This is supposedly closely connected to party 
supporters. Voters understand that not every campaign promise can be kept and that 
party leaders have to give in on some policies for the sake of building a coalition, but this 
is only up to a certain level. It is argued that the voters would then rather prefer their 
party to stay out of the coalition while this signifies a government with policy plans even 
more distant from the ideals of these voters (Warwick). That political parties will not 
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divert outside of their policy horizon out of fear of alienating voters is supported by the 
idea of government responsiveness as argued by Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008). A 
government will respond to the preferences of the people and how this happens when 
there are free elections, given the fact that political parties are in a continuous struggle 
for votes. When political contestation is high, it is expected to lead to higher levels of 
policy responsiveness; the correspondence between what policies the politicians 
identify and prioritise and the policy preferences of the public. 
Part of Warwick’s theory is applicable in the Netherlands. The present coalition 
exists out of two political parties, the VVD ( People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) 
and the PvdA (Labour Party) which are not closely aligned on the political scale. It would 
follow from Warwick’s theory that these two political parties do have enough overlap in 
their policy horizons to ultimately form a coalition government. Both parties had to 
make concessions to one another in order to form a government. Its leaders appear to be 
content with the presented coalition agreement but some of the parties’ backers were 
less than happy. This showed in different polls in the past years. In polls before the 2017 
elections both political parties have lost seats, the VVD went from 41 to 30 seats while 
the PvdA suffered even more severely and went from their current 38 to a polled 
estimate of 11 seats if elections would have been that day (Ipsos, October 13). This 
aligns with Warwick’s argument of how a party’s supporters are not too happy if their 
party has to concede too much of their initial policy plans. This showed itself on multiple 
occasions when the leader of the PvdA, Diederik Samson, had to defend on multiple 
occasions the decision to form a coalition with the VVD to his own party and its 
supporters. Next to the critique that he had defended the policies of the cabinet more 
and more instead of the ideology the party is commonly known for (NRC, January 18, 
2015), inquiries among PvdA mayors, members of the State-Provincial, councillors and 
other PvdA representatives showed how despite supporting their leader and 
understanding the decisions made they have become despondent about the 
collaboration with the VVD (NRC, November 1, 2016). The difference here with 
Warwick’s theory is that the fear of alienating voters when having to make too many 
concessions in order to be part of a coalition should usually frighten the political party 
away from partaking in said coalition. This also goes against the argument and findings 
of Hobolt and Klemmensen, who observed a higher level of responsiveness, especially 
when there is a high uncertainty with regard to next election’s outcome. 
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2.1.2 - The dynamics of the political agenda 
During the formation times, all political parties involved bring their party manifestos to 
the discussion table and attempt to negotiate those issues most central to their political 
party. Consequently, coalition agreements can be extensive documents, with major 
topics constituting the key elements of the agreement, detailing how to tackle these and 
other policy disputes. Coalition agreements are also an important agenda setting tool 
and are in many cases seen as the first collective policy agenda for all parties sharing 
office (Timmermans & Breeman, 2015).  Nevertheless, it is not always easy to prioritise 
policy problems, or to stick to the political agenda as set out by the coalition agreement 
if reality demands a different order. It remains a difficulty to balance the agenda because 
all parties involved need to be in  agreement and see this as an acceptable compromise. 
But even so, any of the resulting coalition agreements are not necessarily followed line 
by line or enforced successfully (Martin, 2004). There is always continuous internal and 
external pressure to change the conditions and update the policy agenda. This pressure 
can come from opposition parties or public opinion but also from parties involved in the 
coalition due to how they may ‘own’ different issues which are at the core of their 
political party or party’s ideology. Voters can thus expect the party they voted on to 
make a stance on these positions and therefore to be an integral part of the coalition 
agreement and the political agenda. As a result, agenda shuffles are not an uncommon 
occurrence due the emergence of specific issues. 
 Shuffles on the political agenda are normal or commonplace in the Netherlands. It 
goes even beyond the mere occurrence of agenda shuffles, specifically that a pattern has 
been detected. This pattern about the link between the agenda setting and attention 
allocation by the government shows an interesting attention drift. During the first year 
of a government’s incumbency, Dutch governments drift away from the policy agenda, 
while moving back to the agenda of the coalition agreement in the years after 
(Timmermans & Breeman, 2014). It can be difficult to find an explanation or a 
clarification for this. Soroka and Wlezien (2009) argue how the agenda may involve a 
prioritisation of problems by monitoring the public opinion while Bertelli and John 
(2014) discuss how it can be a result of systematic calculation or risk and reward of the 
public policy investment.  
In the Netherlands this drift can be noticed by comparing the attention allocation 
of the coalition agreement with the bills submitted in the Dutch House of 
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Representatives. Martin (2004) gives a possible clarification, namely that initiatives that 
are attractive to all coalition partners are more probable to be prioritised on the agenda 
in comparison to more unattractive issues. Another pattern which has been 
distinguished by Timmermans and Breeman (2015) is about the main topics of a 
cabinet. The topics which may be prioritised in the coalition agreement are not 
necessarily the same topics which are seen as the main priorities in the executive 
speeches. They speculate how issues can arise during the preparations of the annual 
speech of the throne due to public expectation, even though these were not seen as 
critical or important while negotiating the coalition agreement. 
 With regards to the hypothesis Instead of following the pattern found in previous 
research the Rutte-II government has broken with this pattern while the Political Business 
Cycle did not influence the political agenda, I argue that a break with the observed 
pattern has occurred. This goes against other literature, such as by Breeman et al. 
(2009), who state that (big) changes in issue-attention are most often initiated by 
governments or large political parties whom have been able to prolong their time in 
office. To specify, what is meant with large political parties are those political parties 
who in the former and new government have many parliamentary seats after the 
elections. It is argued how this corresponds with the theory of punctuated equilibrium, 
where major changes result from processes of feedback. The Rutte-I government only 
had a relatively short life-span before the plug was pulled because of the withdrawing of 
support by another political party and leading to a minority government. For this reason 
it can be that cabinet Rutte-II, despite a different coalition partner, wanted to use the 
opportunity to first handle those issues close to their electorate. If this is the case, a high 
level of government responsiveness can be expected, or at least responsiveness to the 
preferences of VVD voters. So far research has shown that proposals which are 
introduced relatively early during a cabinet’s term have a greater chance of passing in 
parliament and becoming laws. However, the research focused on the correlation 
between the coalition agreements and bills introduced from year to year (Timmermans 
& Breeman, 2014) while this research looks at the executive speeches. The priority 
research has only used the average of the attention allocation for all the executive 
speeches occurring during a government’s term in office to correlate with the belonging 
coalition agreement. I will split these averages up to compare the correlation per year in 
order to establish the application of the Political Business Cycle in previous cabinets.  
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2.1.3 – The Political Business Cycle 
During a government's time in office, a lot of policies are implemented. Many policies are 
related to the economy and economic welfare of a nation. Policies are often public 
investment decisions and can be a choice between present and future (economic) 
welfare. The argument of the Political Business Cycle (PBC) is that an incumbent 
government will implement as many economic policies as possible which will maximise 
the possibility of a positive outcome at the next elections. The idea behind this is that 
both the political parties and the electorate are rational actors and will thus act 
accordingly. 
 This means that households and citizens, when they are presented with a wealth 
of alternative choices concerning political parties, they will base their voting behaviour 
on previous experiences (Nordhaus, 1975). The electorate will look at past, usual 
behaviour of the (incumbent) parties and if the expectations they had back then are met 
with these parties actual behaviour for evaluation. When the expectations are congruent 
or even better than expected, it is rational to think that the electorate will vote again for 
that political party and other voters might change and vote as well for the party with 
more positive expected behaviour. Nordhaus (1975) sees a strong party affiliation 
among voters: “If the lag is long, then there will be considerable continuity in a voters’ 
party affiliation” (p. 173), specifically when political parties bring forward a consistent 
ideology. Voters will then align themselves with the political parties of which the tastes 
and policy preferences coincide most with theirs. Because PBC leans heavily on rational 
choice theory, it believes that political parties are solely interested in election outcomes 
and with wanting to win these, that it is assumed they know voter preferences perfectly 
or make it their business to do so. Thus the government would choose economic policies 
during its time in office of which they know with a high level of certainty that it will 
result in a positive outcome. Schultz (1995) argues that the PBC theory as formulated by 
Nordhaus is limited because it assumes that governments always face similar incentives 
to manipulate the economy through policies at election time. This would be too uniform 
and systematic because the economy can fluctuate considerably every so many years. 
Similarly, the political needs of a government might change during their time in office. 
For example, when they are more certain of re-election at that moment, they have less 
incentive to manipulate the economy than when there is less chance or more 
uncertainty of re-election. 
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 While political parties for the most are interested in election outcomes and want 
to win the elections so they can either continue with the set course or want to bring 
changes, it is difficult to fully accept that political parties know voter preferences 
perfectly. This is illustrated by the multi-party system in the Netherlands, with an 
abundance of political parties. It makes it more difficult to fully ascertain the voter 
preferences and which policies to pursue to maintain or enlarge the number of votes. 
 Besides, measuring the performance level of a government is also difficult 
because, as Nordhaus admits, households or individuals do not have an extensive 
knowledge on the objectivity and the feasibility of policies. Next to that, the media can 
play an important role in the perception of incumbent political parties and their 
enforced policies. Political parties may pass many different policies with positive 
outcomes but the media may give more attention to stickier issues which are not 
popular among the citizens or issues which cause rifts between the coalition parties. 
Additionally, citizens may not always think and behave rationally. Sometimes voting 
behaviour is influenced by sentiments or feelings of the voter, which in turn can be 
affected by the portrayal of political parties and policies in the media. Minford and Peel 
(1981) also argue that when we accept that both political parties and voters act 
rationally and the rational expectation is that the incumbent parties influence or attempt 
to influence the economy, voters would then also ‘see through’ this kind of systematic 
exploitation. Thus not leading to a win of votes but most likely to punishing them.  
 Furthermore, Golden and Poterba (1980) question the impact PBC can make on 
the popularity of a politician. In their research they discuss how they did not find 
evidence of political manipulation concerning the macro economy of the United States. 
According to them, previous research lacked the explanation whether politicians can 
measure their popularity after having manipulated via economic policies. They argue 
that a politician’s power is quite limited and how they found no evidence of political 
manipulation concerning the macro economy. This may be attributed to how political 
actors do not have the level of control over policy instruments as was often associated 
with them in prior research. Although it has been established that political actors 
attempt to have a certain level of control over monetary and fiscal policy, it is not clear if 
these efforts are successful with the implementation of specific policies. It could also be 
that the economic manipulation is minimal and inconsequential in comparison to the 
overall economic policies that are implemented. 
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 In addition, the PBC builds a lot on a government’s planning: when it would be 
best to introduce certain policy proposals and successfully implement them. Although it 
is admitted by Nordhaus that governments can be constrained by political realities, the 
strength and survival of a coalition lies in their reactive capabilities. Governments need 
to be able to be flexible if the situation requires it, and adjust their political agenda 
accordingly. Especially in the current political and international climate it is important 
that a government is responsive. Globalisation and (inter)national issues may 
necessitate that attention is forcedly given to those issues which were not present or 
prominent while making the agenda but either rose in importance or came to be 
important through unexpected occurrences. In some occasions, issues are placed on the 
agenda or need more attention than anticipated at first due to public opinion. If a certain 
issue is deemed important by the public or a significant part of the population, political 
parties cannot remain aloof when the population wants the issue to be put on the 
agenda to be discussed, often immediately. It would therefore be increasingly difficult 
for a Dutch government to apply the PBC and yield the benefits when a lot of their 
planned policies have to be tabled or did not pass in time to have a positive effect for the 
next elections. I agree to a certain extent with Golden and Poterba (1980) that the 
influence of manipulation by a politicians is quite limited, especially in this day and age. 
But it could be that if an incumbent politician or political party has the opportunity to 
manipulate the elections through the implementation of (economic) policies, these may 
have significant effect on the next elections. I do question the possibility of exerting this 
influence due to the changing nature of the political agendas, hence making it difficult to 
maintain their ‘manipulative’ policy agenda if other issues are pressing for attention. 
Specifically in the Netherlands due to the involvement of multiple political parties in a 
coalition who generally have their own agenda, separately from the main political 
agenda. 
 
2.1.4 – Hypothesis 
The hypothesis: Instead of following the pattern found in previous research the Rutte-II 
government has broken with this pattern while the Political Business Cycle did not 
influence the political agenda, continues with previously done research on the topic of 
the political agendas of Dutch governments, but in this cases it is subject specific, 
focusing on cabinet Rutte-II. In earlier research, the predictions were that Dutch 
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governments will at first follow the political agenda as set out in the coalition agreement 
quite closely but then divert more from it in the passing years in office. The explanation 
for this expectation can be found in the institutional mechanisms of governance and the 
legislative agenda and its limited capacity (Timmermans & Breeman, 2014). Continuous 
pressure and new information political and social circles would influence the redirection 
of attention. It was therefore expected that government parties will attempt to tackle as 
many policies as outlined in the coalition agreement before the time and attention 
allocated to these issues is usurped by new issues. However, this expectation of the 
results was not met, seeing how it is actually the first year when a Dutch government 
diverts most of its attention to issues outside of the coalition agreement. This research 
had looked at correspondence between the coalition agreement and the actual 
political/legislative agenda. This showed how it actually is in the second and third years 
in office that a Dutch government moves closer to the agenda of the coalition agreement. 
If a Dutch government manages to stay longer in office, correspondence levels dropped 
again to the point of departure (Timmermans & Breeman, 2010). 
  The Political Business Cycle theory asserts that incumbent political parties will 
manipulate the economy through the introduction and implementation of policies which 
will yield positive opinions among the electorate in the year of the next election. 
Nordhaus (1975) argues how politicians and voters are both rational actors and will 
therefore subsequently base their policies and voting behaviour on knowing the voter 
preferences and experiences with past behaviour of the political parties. Nevertheless, I 
argue the influence of the PBC is becoming increasingly minimal, if it had any significant 
influence at all, as Golden and Poterba (1980) question. In the Netherlands, there are 
multiple factors which potentially limit the effects of the PBC. The media may portray 
certain issues and policies in a certain light which in turn can influence the rational 
information process. Next to that, humans are often not purely rational and feelings and 
sentiments can as a consequence influence voting behaviour. Likewise is it very difficult 
to properly use the Political Business Cycle and yield positive outcomes in a multiparty 
system with a coalition government structure.  
In order to empirically look whether the government used the PBC, I will look at 
the topics as presented on the coalition agreement and the topics on the executive 
speeches and the correlation throughout the years. If a PBC is present, we should see a 
consistent higher correlation in the final year of a government’s term in comparison to 
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their first year. If there are changes in attention, either by topics receiving more 
attention than initially planned or being removed or added altogether, I will look at the 
popularity of these issues and what caused this change. Due to (inter)national issues and 
the disclosure or unveiling of new information, it will become increasingly difficult to 
hold onto the political agenda and its attention allocation. The development of new 
problems leads to agenda changes, especially if there is public outcry on the matter, and 
agenda changes are either initiated by the government or the opposition. With the 
chance of a polarising society and the ‘popping up’ of political parties like toadstools to 
play into the public’s dissatisfaction with the political elite and establishment, it 
becomes difficult to ascertain voter preferences. As a result it makes it difficult for 
political parties to be or to become that party which can unite (a large part of) the 
fragmented electorate.  It is for this reason that I doubt a strong influence of the PBC for 
the Rutte-II cabinet. 
 The concepts defined and described in the conceptual framework are connected 
to the hypothesis and will help in explaining the hypothesis and the main and sub- 
research questions. The previous coalition formation brought forward the current 
caretaker cabinet, consisting out of the VVD and PvdA. These parties have together 
formulated a coalition agreement in which they have set out their policy plans for their 
time in office. The coalition agreement of the present cabinet is quite extensive and 
detailed. This is possibly to reduce uncertainty between the coalition partners but also 
to ensure that some of their policies are included or issues close to the party’s ideology 
are incorporated. The political agenda and the attention allocation thereof are highly 
important for this hypothesis and research questions. With the presentation of the 
coalition agreement the cabinet also presents the initial political agenda and connected 
to that is the allocation of attention. The attention is allocated to those topics the cabinet 
finds most important but this allocation has the habit of changing. It might be that the 
situation requires it to change. Certain occurrences necessitate the government to act 
instantly, requiring space and time on the legislative agenda. Due to this, other issues 
deemed less of a priority will be given less attention or possibly no attention at all in the 
foreseeable future. With the yearly speech of the throne, the cabinet presents its policy 
plans for the upcoming year. The executive speech is therefore a useful tool to establish 
the correspondence levels between the coalition agreement and the legislative agenda 
as presented during Prinsjesdag. 
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 The hypothesis is based on the sub-questions posed earlier. The first one will 
look into how the attention is allocated in the government agreement  and what the 
main topics of concern are for this government. This brings us to the next sub-question, 
to check whether there are significant variations regarding the main topics per 
government, which is also connected to the third sub-question.  The third sub-question 
aims to find out whether there is agenda drift or correspondence between the attention 
allocation of the coalition agreement and the executive speeches. The executive speech 
is for this reason a useful tool to track yearly the correspondence/drift levels between 
the coalition agreement and the planned legislative agenda presented each year on 
Prinsjesdag. This will be answered with sub-question four, what pattern of agenda drift 
or correspondence can be found. It allows us to verify whether this cabinet will at first 
have a low correspondence level between the coalition agreement and the actual 
legislative agenda’s of the years 2012 – 2017. The last sub-question will look into the 
feasible application and effects of the PBC. It will also try to determine why certain 
issues caused the shifts in attention allocation. 
 
 
2.2 – Dependent and Independent Variable 
 
The dependent variable of this thesis is the level of agenda correspondence/agenda drift 
between the political agenda and the executive speeches. Correspondence and drift are 
officially two different words but they have the same goal: to what extent does the 
political agenda of the coalition agreement match with the political agenda of the 
executive speeches? So basically if there is agenda drift or if they stick to the attention 
allocation of the agenda.   
 The independent variable are the demands in society and the political climate 
which necessitate attention given to smaller issues, or issues not on the political agenda 
instead of spending attention and time on the topics the government actually wanted to 
discuss. This also connects to the PBC, which assumes that these demands have led to 
the PBC having not as much effect as the government would have preferred. These 
changes in attention allocation will affect the political agenda and the extent to which 
the government sticks to the attention allocation of the coalition agreement.  
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2.3 – Key concepts 
 
2.3.1 – Coalition formation 
 
‘To complain about the other is of no use. Working together will bring this country forward 
and that’s what we have chosen for.’ 
 
  – Diederik Samson, former leader of the PvdA(as translated by the author of this thesis) 
 
The general definition of coalition formation states how different individuals or agents, 
for their own self-interest, deliberately get together to combine their efforts and 
determine the actions they need to take in order to affect change for a common cause 
(Ray & Vohra, 2015). The Cambridge Dictionary already goes a bit further in their 
definition, focussing on the political aspect of coalition formation: “The joining together 
of different political parties or groups for a particular purpose, usually for a limited time, 
or a government that is formed in this way” (Coalition formation, n.d.). My research will 
focus on the coalition formation in the political sphere.  
In the Netherlands, coalition formation are the talks and discussions following 
the election results between prospective partners. This starts with an ‘informateur’, 
someone who explores possible governing collaborations between political parties. 
Usually these contain the parties which received the most parliamentary seats or will at 
least combined have the majority of seats. The role of the ‘informateur’ is to verify if 
these parties are willing to form a government with one another. In some occasions he 
draws up a draft of the coalition agreement. This usually contains the common goals and 
plans of the political parties involved. After the potential governing partners have been 
identified, a ‘formateur’ will lead the final stages of the formation process. The 
‘formateur’ is often the person who will become the prime minister in this new 
government. He or she will discuss the division of the ministerial posts with the leaders 
of the other political parties involved. The candidate ministers and secretaries of state 
will meet with the ‘formateur’ and formally assent to the coalition agreement. 
There have been some significant changes concerning the formation process in 
the Netherlands, which was used for the first time on the formation of the 2012 
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government. On previous occasions, the Dutch monarch had a neutral, leading role in the 
process in which she appointed (in)formateurs. However, with the alteration in the 
Parliamentary procedures (Reglement van Orde) the House of Representatives would 
from that point onwards assign these responsibilities. With the only remaining task for 
the monarch being to formally nominate and inaugurate the ministers and secretary of 
state, the previous link between politics and the court became extremely limited (van 
Baalen & van Kessel, 2013). Also other advisory roles such as the President of the Senate 
were no longer applicable in the new process. Considerably, the 2010 formation process 
is one of the fastest in Dutch history by lasting only fifty-four days. It has to be noted that 
the new process was not a done deal. Parts of the development were only realised 
during the process. The goals of the new process were to be more transparent, more 
democratic and faster. It is difficult to judge on all points if these increased. Regarding 
transparency and a more democratic process, there are positive and negative sides. It is 
also unclear if limiting the neutral role of the monarch actually led to a faster process, 
seeing how there are other cases in which the ‘informateur’ was appointed as fast as was 
the case here. 
 
2.3.2 – Coalition Agreements 
At the end of the formation process, the newly minted government presents the 
coalition agreement. Moury (2010) explains how a coalition agreement is ultimately 
seen as a written contract between the ministers in which the legitimate expectations of 
the principals, here the coalition parties, are specified opposite the agent, here the 
ministers. Moury continues how a coalition agreement can serve in such a way because 
it can be used as a device to assure commitment between the political parties as well as 
within all political parties involved.  
A coalition agreement is the usual result of the formation process. These 
agreements are considered to be of high importance and seen as an institutional 
mechanism of agenda setting (Timmermans & Breeman, 2014). Coalition agreements 
are generally believed to reduce uncertainty between the governing parties and enhance 
parliamentary support regarding policy proposals. On the other hand, a coalition 
agreement can also be a real challenge for the political parties involved due to it being a 
game of give and take. Therefore, the coalition agreement is a product of vigorous and 
meticulous discussion and debate between the potential political partners.  
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This occurs a lot in Dutch governance, with its multiple political parties, 
sometimes leading to elaborate or unusual collaborations. Governing parties have 
certain core issues of their campaigns which they want to see back in the coalition 
agreement, either to ensure that certain changes will be made through policy proposals 
or to ensure nothing will change by officially recording it in the coalition agreement as 
such. It is also argued by mandate theory that political parties have to deliver on their 
campaign promises by their voters. Logical thinking leads us to believe that when a 
political party negates on the realisation of its election promises, the electorate will 
consider voting for another party which might honour its commitment more. 
Nevertheless, it may be that the coalition parties have to give in on some of their 
issues in order for the formation talks to succeed and be able to govern. Party leaders 
can be called upon by their voters to explain why they have given in on certain key 
points of their campaign or issues which belong to the core of the party’s identity. That is 
why coalition agreements are often the result of hard bargaining, also to show its 
constituency that voting for them was not in vain and that they did not betray them or 
their party’s values. What has to be understood of the coalition agreement is that it is not 
officially a legally binding document. This is due to the changing nature of politics which 
often requires to step away from the agreement on some issues. However, the 
publication of the coalition agreement is seen as significant because it establishes the 
commitment of a political party to certain issues and deals on policies and can lead to 
damaging relationships with other political parties or the loss of credibility among other 
political parties as well as the electorate when backing out, especially if there is no 
perceived circumstance in society which caused the withdrawal. 
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2.3.3 – The Political Agenda and Attention Allocation 
 
 “Yes, adjustments in the Netherlands are accompanied by consultation and compromises. 
And that is fine. With that belongs a cabinet which knows exactly what it wants and 
doesn’t get stuck in what it feels is right. ”  
 
 – prime minister Mark Rutte (as translated by the author of this thesis) 
 
The political agenda exist out of a set of issues that are central to the decision making 
and debates within a given political system at any time (Baumgartner, 2001). The 
political agenda is the list of issues to which political actors will pay attention (Walgrave, 
Soroka & Nuytemans, 2008). Closely connected to the political agenda is the attention 
allocation: the division of the attention by political parties on policy issues. Determining 
the allocation of attention and thus also determining the agenda is seen as “a necessary 
precondition for almost any kind of political decision” (Walgrave, Soroka & Nuytemans, 
2008, p. 815). The coalition agreement is the first plan of action of a government. It 
details the policies and political issues which a governments wants to address. 
 Because the political agenda is closely intertwined with attention allocation, 
these two concepts will be discussed together. The political agenda, or legislative agenda 
or policy agenda, is basically the proposed plans, initial schedule or agenda of the 
government. Policy issues and intended plans and changes are set out in the coalition 
agreement. The coalition agreement is therefore the initial political agenda, detailing 
which issues will be changed or introduced as policy proposals in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. With the presentation of the coalition agreement at the 
commencement of the government, it is also the presentation of the initial attention 
allocation of this political agenda. The coalition agreement does not only contain the 
issues deemed important to discuss and formulate into an official document, it also 
constitutes the allocation of the political attention. It means that it has not only been 
decided what the government wants to change or introduce through policies but also 
when and how much time it prefers to spend on it. The big difference between the 
previous concepts and the political agenda and attention allocation is that these are 
subjected to change during the run of a government. This is not illogical, given the fact 
that a government has to play into the ever changing situations (inter)nationally. But in 
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order for a government to adjust, the attention allocation will have to change, by 
diminishing attention for issues seen as less important at that moment or bumping them 
altogether from the agenda in order to put these newly arisen and more pressing issues 
on the political agenda and give them more attention. How the attention is allocated can 
be identified by seeing which (main) topics are discussed in the coalition agreement and 
based on the number of topics, how often they recur and how much space and 
clarification is deemed necessary to spend on these policy issues. 
 
2.3.4 – The Executive Speech 
The Executive speech, in Dutch known as the Troonrede, is the yearly speech given 
every third Tuesday of September (Prince’s Day/Prinsjesdag) by the Dutch monarch. On 
this day the king will open the ‘work year’ of the Dutch parliament with this speech. The 
speech is highly important by containing the legislative agenda and the most important 
plans and proposals of the cabinet for that upcoming year. Whereas the coalition 
agreement is the initial legislative agenda at the start of a cabinet’s time in office, the 
executive speech is a yearly update on the legislative agenda as set out in the coalition 
agreement. It is considered as an updated political agenda, with often a new attention 
allocation. It informs the opposition and the citizens of the Netherlands of which policies 
and budgets will be modified as well as the introduction of new issues or policies in the 
agenda, hence how the attention will be allocated for that year.  
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3 – Research Method 
 
3.1 - Data and Method 
 
The type of research conducted in this thesis will be case study research while 
combining it with quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. The goal of this 
thesis is to investigate and explain phenomena more in-depth and within its real-life 
context. It is for this reason that different forms of research are combined in this thesis. 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, this dissertation will investigate the attention 
allocation of policy issues in the agenda of cabinet Rutte-II and to what extent this aligns 
to the coalition agreement. To do so, different data will be collected and used. Another 
aim of this thesis is to see whether a previously established trend in the attention 
allocation cycle is continued with the current government and the possible application 
and effect of the Political Business Cycle. In order to test the hypothesis and expectations 
for this case study two different datasets will be used; the coalition agreements from 
1963 up until the 2012 coalition agreement and the executive speeches for that entire 
period. Specific attention will be given to the 2012 coalition agreement of cabinet Rutte-
II and the executive speeches given during that same government’s time in office. This is 
so because the other coalition agreements of previous cabinets have already been 
investigated regarding their correspondence level with the executive speeches. 
 The coalition agreements from 1963 up until 2010 have been coded by Breeman 
and Timmermans (2009) with the use of the Dutch codebook. This codebook is based on 
the Danish codebook of Christoffer Green-Pedersen and the American codebook by Scott 
Adler and John Wilkerson. Both of these codebooks are derived from the original 
codebook of Frank Baumgarnter, Bryan Jones and John Wilkerson, as used for the Policy 
Agenda Project (PAP). The Dutch codebook is identical to the other codebook 
concerning the 19 maincodes, such as economy and taxes; civil rights; social security 
and the labour market, although a few of the subcodes which are irrelevant or 
inapplicable to the Dutch situation have been removed while some others have been 
added by the Dutch authors. The complete list of the main categories is given in 
Appendix A. The coalition agreement of the current cabinet dates from 2012 and had not 
been coded yet. This has been done by the author of this thesis. The agreement is split 
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up into different statements and paragraphs, with a total of 375 points to be coded.  To 
add validity to this coding and the results of the final (comparative) analysis, the same 
codebook and instructions of coding as used for the coding of the other coalition 
agreements will be used. Besides all statements and paragraphs being divided into the 
main-codes and sub-codes based on content, they will also be evaluated on containing 
actual policy or if they merely refer to the government formation process or very 
general points which are not relevant to the legislative agenda.  
 In order to check the level of correspondence between the coalition agreement 
and the yearly policy agenda of cabinet Rutte-II, the speeches of the throne, 
‘Troonredes’, will be used as a reference for this. The speeches of the throne are a yearly 
occurrence, every third Tuesday of September. It is considered to be the opening of the 
work year of parliament. The speech, as hinted at by its name, is given by the king and 
includes the most important plans and points of the political agenda of the government. 
This makes it useful data in order to see the correspondence between the coalition 
agreement and the attention allocation of policy issues. The speeches are also coded 
according to the Dutch codebook by the authors, but instead of being divided per 
paragraph they are divided per sentence or quasi-sentence. With the current 
government having lasted its four year term in office, it gives us four troonredes of 
which the data can be used. Thus, giving us all the data needed to establish the 
continuation or the end of the discovered trend and will give a more clear insight in the 
utilisation of the PBC. 
 After the data collection and the coding of the remaining coalition agreement, 
descriptive statistics will be used in order to validate the hypothesis of this thesis and 
provide an answer to the main research question. The quantitative analyses as 
generated by RStudio, and Excel allow us to check the attention allocation in 
percentages of the current coalition agreement as well as the correlation (or the possible 
lack thereof) with the attention allocation of the previous coalition agreements. It will 
also be used to ascertain the correspondence levels between the coalition agreement 
and the executive speeches, thus permitting us to substantiate the hypothesis. The 
results of the descriptive statistics will be discussed and analysed in the following 
chapter. In addition, when looking into the top 5 of most ‘popular’ topics in the executive 
speeches it sometimes happens that multiple categories have the same percentage of 
attention allocation. If this happens it is first checked if these categories are also part of 
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the top 5 in the coalition agreement. If one is, then that one is selected as the last one. If 
this is not the case or both are, then the category with the lowest numerical code is 
selected. 
 The units of analysis are the coded statements of the coalition agreements for the 
period of 1963 – 2016, with the statements of Rutte-II being coded by the author of this 
thesis and the coded statements of the executive speeches for the years of 2013 – 2016. 
The coded statements of Rutte-II are the units of observation of this research and to 
answer the sub-questions and main research question. The units of analysis are used to 
make comparisons between the coded statements of the current coalition agreement 
and previous ones to draw conclusions on change in the main topics and to establish the 
continuation or break of the agenda pattern. 
 
 
3.2 – Operationalisation of Concepts 
 
Concept Definition Indicators Data sources 
Coalition 
formation 
The process of 
coming to a 
coalition 
government after 
no political party 
has won the 
majority of seats 
after elections, 
usually resulting in 
political parties 
sharing executive 
power and forming 
a legislative 
agenda, the 
coalition 
agreement 
- The different 
‘informateurs’ 
and 
‘formateurs’ 
involved in the 
formation 
process 
-  
- News articles 
and official 
documents on 
formation 
process 
 
Coalition 
agreements 
The resulting 
product of 
coalition 
formation, 
detailing the policy 
plans for a 
government’s time 
in office. A 
- Satisfaction of 
political parties 
involved with 
produced 
agreement 
 
- Actual coalition 
agreement, 
coded on 
content for the 
period 1963 - 
2012 
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document of 
varying length and 
detail, 
often/sometimes 
consisting out of 
policy compromise 
between coalition 
partners 
Political agenda Also called the 
policy or legislative 
agenda; the agenda 
of the cabinet on 
which the policy 
issues are set to be 
discussed. Subject 
to change when 
situation requires 
it. The coalition 
agreement is the 
initial political 
agenda of a cabinet 
The policy initiatives 
as presented by 
government/ministers 
- Coalition 
agreements 
- Troonredes/ 
Executive 
speeches 
- Detailed 
budgetary 
documents; 
‘Rijksbegroting’
and 
‘Miljoenennota’ 
Attention 
allocation 
The allocation of 
attention and time 
the cabinet would 
like to spend on 
policy issues on the 
political agenda. 
Subject to change 
when new issues 
arise and are put 
on the political 
agenda 
- (allocated) 
time spend per 
issue 
- Number of 
topics with 
detailed 
explanations 
- The topics 
receiving more 
attention on the 
agenda by 
having more 
details and 
explanations 
given 
- Percentages 
attention given 
towards topics, 
as coded on 
content in the 
coalition 
agreement as 
well as the 
troonredes 
Troonrede/  
Executive 
speeches 
‘Speech of the 
throne’ given 
yearly by the Dutch 
monarch on every 
third Tuesday of 
September. 
Considered to be 
the opening of the 
work year of 
Parliament. 
Detailing the 
- The speech as 
given by the 
monarch 
- The troonredes 
for the years 
2013 – 2016, as 
coded by 
content 
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political agenda of 
the government for 
that upcoming 
year, can include 
changes in issues 
compared to 
coalition 
agreement and 
changes in 
attention 
allocation 
The Political 
Business Cycle 
The manipulation 
by politicians of 
the national 
economy by 
implementing 
negative policies in 
the beginning and 
positive policies at 
the end of their 
term, thus giving 
them a bigger 
chance of re-
election 
- The issues on 
the coalition 
agreement and 
executive 
speeches 
- Changes in the 
attention 
allocation of 
the political 
agenda  
- The coalition 
agreements of 
1963 - 2012 
- The executive 
speeches for the 
years 2013 - 
2016 
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4 – Analysis  
 
In this chapter I will show and discuss the results of the datasets in order to give 
answers to the posed sub-questions. 
 
4.1 – Sub-question 1: Attention allocation of current coalition agreement 
 
After importing the coded dataset of the 2012 coalition agreement into RStudio, it 
resulted in the following plots. Figure 1 shows the attention allocation of the 2012 
coalition agreements in percentages. What is interesting to observe is that the categories 
with the highest allotment of attention is Education & Culture, and how this category is 
significantly larger than the other top categories, which are much closer in range. 
 
Figure 1: The attention allocation per categories in percentages for the 2012 coalition agreement 
 
When we look into the content of the 2012 coalition agreement, explanations may 
be found for the high number for the Education & Culture category. The introduction 
states how Dutch education is of a high standard and valued as such by the Dutch 
government. For this reason the aim was to keep education as much as possible outside 
of budget cuts and even with plans to invest more in education despite still being in the 
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aftermath of the economic crisis from 2008. Multiple statements concerning the quality 
of teachers and schools, how these can be improved and stimulated even further as well 
as multiple points on the development of children’s (language) abilities and tackle such 
related issues early on are abundant throughout this policy document. In addition, this 
category does not solely encompasses education on any level, but also includes culture 
and sports. Some statements are a combination of these sections such as the need for 
more physical education in primary and high schools, while others are more singularly 
focused on one section, such as the chance for families with lower income to participate 
in sports. Ultimately, seeing how this category is  rather substantial with wide-ranging 
(sub)topics, it is not too strange this category is in the top 5 (It was part of the top 5 
seven times out of seventeen for the entire 1963 – 2012 period).  
What is remarkable is how in the introduction of the coalition agreement it is 
explicitly mentioned how big reforms and breakthroughs are necessary in the housing 
and energy sectors, but less attention is given to these categories. An explanation for this 
could be that some statements fall into the environment or science & technology 
categories, even though these categories are not that big themselves either. These 
categories might require less attention concerning the necessary changes or it was at the 
time not clear how to change to set this out on paper. In addition, the introduction of the 
coalition agreement claims that the Netherlands will benefit from high quality service by 
the government and how we should create more space and appreciation for 
workmanship, how this should translate in pride for employees in the education, 
healthcare sector and the police. While there are statements regarding education 
personnel, policy plans for higher quality for teachers, rewarding ‘excellent’ schools, 
teachers and deans, there are not many statements specifically for healthcare personnel 
or the police.  
 
 
4.2 – Sub-question 2: Variations in main topics of coalition agreements 
 
Whilst with the first sub-question I looked at the attention allocation of the 2012 
coalition agreement, in this question I will check the main topics of this coalition 
agreement against all previous agreements. For this purpose we have computed the 
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attention allocation in percentages of all the coalition agreements from 1963-2010 
together and each coalition agreement separately. Not all figures of the individual 
attention allocation of the coalition agreements are discussed and shown in this chapter 
but these can be found in Appendix B. The plots of the first few coalition agreements 
have fewer categories, but this is explained by how some of these categories were not 
mentioned in any (autonomous) capacity while we observe an increase of topics in later 
coalitions, with all topics being mentioned at least once.  
 What is interesting to see is how the category of the Macro-economy is not 
present in the topic top 5 of both the 2010 and 2012 coalition agreements. In this regard 
both of the Rutte cabinets have made a drastic change in comparison to their 
predecessors, who have always had the Macro-economy in their top 5. So up until 2010, 
the Macro-economy was a popular, if not the most popular topic within the top 5 of 
coalition agreements. Another often recurring category is Public Administration, present 
for fourteen out of the seventeen coalition agreements. But as we will see later with sub-
question three, it shows that even though a category was given a lot of attention in 
coalition agreements up until 2010, this does not necessarily mean that it is also absent 
from the top 5 of the executive speeches either. 
 Another observation is that between the different coalition agreements the top 
5’s do not always differ too much. It is not too surprising that these main categories are 
represented many times. There are of course other issues at play which may account for 
the prominence of other categories in these agreements, such as Rights, Justice, 
Education and Public Administration. The next sub-question will further delve into the 
topics on the executive speeches and the sometimes even opposing results of the 
correlation between the speeches and agreements. This specifically when looking at the 
top 5. 
To come back to the sub-question: Are there significant variations percentage wise 
in the attention allocation in the main topics compared to previous governments? I deem 
the answer to be yes: on average there have been some changes in the attention 
allocation when we look at the main topics and even more specifically when we look at 
the top 5 of the 2012 coalition agreement. Education has been a recurring topic on 
occassions in the top 5 of previous agreements but never as the top category. As 
explained in sub-question 1, this category also includes sports and culture and it was 
stated by the government how education is seen as important and therefore left out of 
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budget cuts as much as possible. When we look into the content of the 2012 coalition 
agreement we can also see some detailed policies regarding education such as the 
change of the student aid system, how to improve the quality of schools and teachers 
and the support for children with learning disabilities or who have the potential of 
falling behind. If we look at the coalition agreement of 2010, the top 5 is almost the exact 
same: instead of Foreign Policy the 2010 top 5 includes the category of Health. 
Regardless of the difference in order between both policy agendas, the percentages of 
attention allocation within the top 5 of both agreements are most often very close 
together, as shown in Table 1 below. 
 
Year/place 1 2 3 4 5 
2010 
Rights: Justice: 
12,68191 
Education:  
11,64241 
Health: Public Adm.: 
13,30561 11,43451 8,108108 
2012 
Education: Public Adm.,: Foreign Policy: 
8,776596 
Justice: Rights: 
8,244681 12,5 9,042553 8,510638 
Table 1: 2010 and 2012 Coalition Agreements Top 5 
 
If we look at the other years, there are more variations between the 2012 coalition 
agreement and those previous ones. As stated, both of these last two coalition 
agreements do not have the Macro-economy in their top 5, so in this sense these 
agreements break with tradition. The 2010 and 2012 do include the Public 
Administration category. If we look at the difference of allocation attention for this 
category in both agendas, there is only a difference of 0.93, indicating that this is an 
important category at the beginning of both cabinets’ term in office. 
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Correlation Coalition Agreement and Executive 
Speeches 1963 - 2016 
4.3 – Sub-question 3: Agenda drift or correspondence? 
 
After having coded the 2012 coalition agreement, it was possible to correlate this with 
the already coded executive speeches. This was done including all topics as mentioned in 
both political agendas and resulted into the following graph. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
What we see here in Figure 2 is that there is a very irregular pattern of correlation 
between the different governments. It is also difficult to find a pattern in the subsequent 
cabinets of the same prime minister. We observe that possibly the Lubbers cabinets 
(1982- 1994) dared more to experiment with the drift in attention allocation. In 
consonance with the literature this would not be very odd given the fact that there was 
either no turnover or only a partial turnover respecting the political parties involved in 
the coalition. During the first Lubbers cabinet (1982 – 1986) the correlation more or less 
stayed the same (0.50; 0.55; 0.52) while during the second (1986 – 1989) it started with 
a high correlation and ended lower ( 0.76; 0.72; 0.63; 0.65), though still not near the 
total average of 0.5168. Meanwhile, the third Lubbers cabinet (1989 – 1994) started low 
and actually ended up pretty strong: 0.24; 0.34; 0.39; 0.67. A similar conclusion is drawn 
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when we look at both Kok cabinets (1994 – 2002). These cabinets did not experiment 
too much in the beginning and actually started out with relatively high correlations of 
0.63 and 0.57 respectively, but then to decrease during the years. Although Kok-I stayed 
relatively level (0.63 – 0.51), Kok-II plummeted from a correlation of 0.53 in its third 
year to a low 0.37 in its final year. 
 Maybe Kok-II started a new tendency which was continued with the Balkenende 
cabinets. Because in general, most cabinets ended their final year with a correlation 
above the total average (not per se higher than in their first year), sometimes even far 
above it. Although Balkende – I lasted only for one year, his following cabinets started all 
strong (0.7 or higher) and ended up with quite low correlation (averagely 0.35) in their 
final year. It would be impossible to say if Rutte – I appeared to continue with this trend. 
Not only because it started relatively low (0.32) but because it decreased even more to a 
negative correlation (-0.006). This is an irregularity not seen before. Potentially Rutte – I 
might have picked up and got a stronger correlation if it lasted more years due to the 
pattern of some previous cabinets which went up and down throughout the years as 
well. It can be said with certainty that the trend started with Kok – II did not continue 
with Rutte – II. Table 2 actually shows how Rutte – II is a ‘normal’ cabinet with an up and 
down correlation pattern as most other governments had. 
 
Coalition 
agreement 
Executive 
speeches 
Correlation 
per year 
2012 2013 0,325321 
  2014 0,51642 
  2015 0,386811 
  2016 0,460434 
Table 2: Correlation 2012 Coalition Agreement 
 
 In order to look to look beyond the correlation of merely all categories, I also 
looked into the top 5 of the categories concerning the attention allocation. The 
correlation alone could not give enough insight per coalition and it led to surprising 
results when I looked into this. In order to correctly check the top 5 of the most popular 
topics, I checked this against the tally of all topics in the top 5 for all agreements and 
speeches as set out in Timmermans & Breeman. This research included all coalition 
agreements up until 2012, and all executive speeches up until 2016. As mentioned in the 
previous sub-question, the macro-economy topic showed up in all top 5’s until 2010. 
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However, of the 54 executive speeches, the macro-economy has been part of the top 5 
for most of them, only being absent in the years 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2005. So despite 
not being in the top 5 of the 2010 and 2012 coalition agreements, it was part of the top 5 
of all executive speeches belonging to these agreements. 
 Where the correlation differs each executive speech, we can find a cause for the 
differences when looking at topics of the speech itself and the number of matches with 
the top 5 of the coalition agreement. But when looking at the attention allocation in 
percentages, it is more difficult. For instance, 1982 has a lower correlation than 1981 
even though there are more similarities between the top 5 of the 1982 speech and the 
1981 agreement than with the 1981 executive speech, as set out in table 3 and table 4. 
Another observation shows us that there is not much difference in the topics nor in the 
attention allocation in percentages for those years, but the correlation for the last year is 
significantly lower compared to the starting year. While the difference between the 
percentage in attention allocation of the similar topics is bigger for the years of 2011 
and 2012, it is harder to explain. The speech of 2012 has two similar topics with the 
2010 agreement instead of three topics which was the case in 2011. This does not 
explain the bigger difference in correlation between these two years.  
 To get back to the sub-question: Is there agenda drift or agenda correspondence of 
the coalition agreement in comparison with the executive speeches?, the answer would 
have to be that there are stronger impressions of agenda correspondence. Not only is the 
total average correlation 0.5168, based on 64 executive speeches, more than half of 
these are above the total average, with quite a few being still above the 0.4 mark. For 
this reason I argue that there is strong agenda correspondence collectively. When we 
look per coalition agreement it shows much more variation. The next sub-question will 
go deeper into the pattern of correlation correspondence, specifically concerning the 
Rutte – II government. 
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4.4 – Sub-question 4: Pattern Political Agenda Rutte – II  
 
The correlations of the 2012 coalition agreement also shows a highly irregular pattern. 
The literature stated that on average there is a pattern of starting out further away from 
the attention allocation of the coalition agreement with the first executive speech, to 
move close to the original attention allocation throughout the years. The data shows that 
there is not really anything resembling that pattern except for it to end higher than it 
started. Thus from this perspective I argue that there is no definitive answer whether 
there is agenda correspondence for Rutte-II due to it having a significantly low 
correlation. We can see that the correlation is not as high as it has been on earlier 
occasions. Other years have had higher correlations, even as high as 0.8. 
 Another reason for this might be that the government is not a complete turnover. 
According to literature this would lead to a more fluctuating correlation, seeing how a 
government with one or more political parties of the previous government remaining 
part of the coalition of the new government often leads to more changes and possibly a 
lower correlation. However, when we look into the topics themselves present in the top 
5, it actually shows us that the Macro-economy is in the top 5 consecutively for all 2013 
– 2016 executive speeches. So there is not a break concerning the occurrence of the 
Macro-economy in executive speeches throughout the years. What is actually even more 
surprising is how the topics of the top 5 of the speeches align more with the top 5 of the 
agreement in the lower correlation year. The attention allocation in 2014 and in 2016 is 
more evenly spaced over the topics. This creates smaller or almost no differences 
between the different categories within a top 5, and might therefore explain the higher 
correlation for those years. 
 
 
 
Coalition 
agreement 
 Executive 
Speeches 
 Sum and 
Ratio 
1963 Public Administration, 
Housing,  Macro, 
Commerce, Science 
1963 Foreign Policy, Macro, Housing, 
Agriculture, Education 
5 
2,5 
  1964 Macro, Foreign Policy, Transport, 
Science, Commerce 
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1965 Science, Housing, Macro, 
Energy, Rights 
1965 Macro, Foreign Policy, Education, 
Public Adm., Transport 
2 
1 
  1966 Macro, Foreign Policy, Labour, Public 
Adm., Transport 
 
1967 Commerce, Macro, 
Public Adm., Housing, 
Labour 
1967 Macro, Foreign Policy, Labour, 
Education, Social Security 
10 
2,5 
  1968 Macro, Foreign Policy, Education, 
Public Adm., Transport 
 
  1969 Foreign policy, Macro, Commerce, 
Housing, Education 
 
  1970 Macro, Foreign policy, Public Adm., 
Housing, Foreign trade 
 
1971 Public Adm., Macro, 
Education, Commerce, 
Planning 
1971 Macro, Foreign Policy, Education, 
Defense, Environment 
4 
2 
  1972 Macro, Social security, Foreign policy, 
Public Admn., Transport 
 
1973 Macro, Social security, 
Public Adm., Education, 
Housing 
1973 Macro, Labour, Foreign policy, 
Education, Social security 
12 
2,4 
  1974 Foreign policy, Macro, Labour, Social 
security, Environment 
 
  1975 Macro, Foreign policy, Labour, Social 
security, Public Adm. 
 
  1976 Macro, Foreign policy, Public Adm., 
Labour, Housing 
 
  1977 Macro, Foreign policy, Labour, 
Energy, Foreign trade 
 
1977 Macro, Education, 
Labour, Commerce, 
Public Adm. 
1978 Macro, Labour, Foreign policy, 
Environment, Energy 
6 
2 
 
  1979 Foreign policy, Rights, Macro, Labour, 
Energy 
 
  1980 Macro, Foreign policy, Housing, 
Rights, Labour 
 
1981 Labour, Macro, Public 
Adm., Energy, Social 
Security 
1981 Labour, Macro, Commerce, Defense, 
Foreign policy 
5 
2,5 
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  1982 Macro, Foreign policy, Labour, Social 
security, Defense 
 
1982 Housing, Macro, Foreign 
policy, Science, Public 
Adm. 
1983 Macro, Foreign policy, Public Adm., 
Labour, Defense 
8 
2,67 
  1984 Labour, Macro, Public Adm., Social 
security, Foreign policy 
 
  1985 Macro, Labour, Social security, 
Foreign policy, Education 
 
1986 Macro, Public Adm., 
Labour, Foreign policy, 
Health 
1986 Macro, Foreign policy, Labour, Public 
Adm., Justice 
15 
3,75 
  1987 Labour, Public Adm., Macro, Foreign 
policy, Education 
 
  1988 Labour, Justice, Foreign policy, Macro, 
Public Adm. 
 
  1989 Foreign policy, Labour, Macro, Public 
Adm., Environment  
 
1989 Macro, Labour, 
Education, Health, 
Environment 
1990 Foreign policy, Public Adm., Social 
security, Rights, Labour 
8 
2 
 
  1991 Foreign policy, Public Adm., Labour, 
Macro, Social security 
 
  1992 Foreign policy, Education, Social 
security, Labour, Macro 
 
  1993 Labour, Foreign policy, Macro, Rights, 
Social security 
 
1994 Social security, Health, 
Macro, Education, Public 
Adm. 
1994 Foreign policy, Social security, 
Education, Health, Labour 
10 
2,5 
  1995 Foreign policy, Social security, Health, 
Macro, Justice 
 
  1996 Foreign policy, Social security, Justice, 
Labour, Macro 
 
  1997 Foreign policy, Justice, Social security, 
Macro, Labour 
 
1998 Macro, Public Adm., 
Social security, Labour, 
Health 
1998 Foreign policy, Public Adm., Social 
security, Education, Health 
12 
3 
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  1999 Foreign policy, Public Adm., Social 
security, Macro, Justice 
 
  2000 Foreign policy, Labour, Macro, Social 
security, Justice 
 
  2001 Foreign policy, Public Adm., Macro, 
Health, Rights 
 
2002 Macro, Social security, 
Public Adm., Labour, 
Health 
2002 Foreign policy, Public Adm., Justice, 
Macro, Labour 
3 
3 
2003 Public Adm., Macro, 
Labour, Justice, Social 
security 
2003 Public Adm., Foreign policy, Justice, 
Macro, Social security 
14 
3,5 
  2004 Foreign policy, Public Adm., Labour, 
Social security, Macro 
 
  2005 Justice, Foreign policy, Education 
Public Adm., Labour 
 
  2006 Social security, Foreign policy, 
Education, Public Adm., Macro 
 
2007 Social security, Health, 
Public Adm., Macro, 
Rights 
2007 Foreign policy, Social security, Macro, 
Justice, Health 
7 
1,75 
  2008 Foreign policy, Justice, Macro, Labour, 
Education 
 
  2009 Macro, Labour, Social security, 
Commerce, Foreign policy 
 
  2010 Macro, Labour, Foreign policy, 
Commerce, Housing 
 
2010 Rights, Justice, 
Education, Health, Public 
Adm. 
2011 Macro, Public Adm., Social security, 
Education, Health 
5 
2,5 
  2012 Macro, Foreign policy, Public Adm., 
Health, Commerce 
 
2012 Education, Public Adm., 
Foreign policy, Justice, 
Rights 
2013 Macro, Social security, Labour, 
Foreign policy, Public Adm. 
8 
2 
  2014 Foreign policy, Macro, Labour, Social 
security, Health 
 
  2015 Macro, Foreign policy, Social security, 
Justice, Rights 
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  2016 Foreign policy, Health, Labour, Justice, 
Macro 
 
 
Table 3: Top 5 Coalition Agreements and Executive Speeches 
 
Earlier I explained how we needed to look beyond just the correlation of the 
coalition agreements and the executive speeches into the top 5 for every political agenda 
and compare the top 5’s of the executive speeches to those corresponding coalition 
agreements. What we observe in Timmermans & Breeman is that it is helpful to look not 
just at the correlations nor simply at the top 5’s to establish high or low agenda 
correspondence, but to work with a point system. In table 3 I have added in the last 
column the sum of the total points, which I calculated by looking at the top 5 of a 
coalition agreement and rewarded a point every time one of its topics was recurring in 
the executive speech. However, due to not every government having four corresponding 
executive speeches (in one case there is even a fifth speech due to a lengthy formation 
process for the following cabinet, causing a caretaker speech), I divided the sum by the 
number of years a government published an executive speech to get minimal chances of 
skewed representation. The maximum ratio a coalition could achieve is 5: if a coalition 
lasts two years and ideally the top 5 is fully represented in two executive speeches, the 
sum would be 2+2+2+2+2=10, divided by 2 is 5. Same for a coalition that lasts 4 
(20/4=5) or 5 years (25/5=5). Yet, out of seventeen coalitions, nine lasted four years or 
more, of which none had the maximum amount of points. The result of this division is in 
the same column as the total points but highlighted in red. What is interesting to behold 
is that of the seventeen coalition agreements, ten of these score between 2.0 -2.5, while a 
total of seven score between 2.4 – 2.7. So not that many coalition agreements score over 
half of the maximum ratio. 
 Remarkably, the third Balkenende cabinets has a very high ratio and the fourth a 
rather low one. This is all the more interesting because both cabinets started out with a 
high correlation, decreased throughout the years and ended up with a rather low 
correlation 0. 36. Both Rutte governments have a ratio around the average. 
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Coalition 
agreement 
Executive 
speeches 
Correlation 
per year 
1963  1963 0,323599 
  1964 0,331855 
1965  1965 0,219346 
  1966 0,150751 
1967  1967 0,463111 
  1968 0,490301 
  1969 0,569248 
  1970 0,520323 
1971 1971 0,44661 
  1972 0,540297 
1973 1973 0,78526 
  1974 0,543276 
  1975 0,817497 
  1976 0,813281 
  1977 0,571753 
1977  1978 0,649418 
  1979 0,31276 
  1980 0,680005 
1981  1981 0,787106 
  1982 0,632953 
1982  1983 0,504003 
  1984 0,552218 
  1985 0,522491 
1986  1986 0,758229 
  1987 0,719459 
  1988 0,628109 
  1989 0,6529 
1989  1990 0,23783 
  1991 0,34424 
  1992 0,38856 
  1993 0,671508 
1994 1994 0,634412 
  1995 0,557029 
  1996 0,518362 
  1997 0,513142 
1998 1998 0,571568 
  1999 0,505324 
  2000 0,529167 
  2001 0,372297 
2002 2002 0,616371 
2003 2003 0,739693 
  2004 0,703468 
  2005 0,581497 
  2006 0,358985 
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2007  2007 0,702604 
  2008 0,530645 
  2009 0,476407 
  2010 0,366252 
2010  2011 0,319438 
  2012 -0,00674 
2012  2013 0,325321 
  2014 0,51642 
  2015 0,386811 
  2016 0,460434 
Table 4: Correlations coalition agreements and 
                 corresponding executive speeches 
 
When we look into the specifics of the Rutte – II government, we notice that the trend of 
deviating more and more from the agreement as started in the late 90’s is not continued. 
Even more, it appears that Rutte – II is not a government which shows aberrant 
behaviour. There are multiple findings supporting this statement. When we look in table 
4 at the correlations of the executive speeches of the period 2013 – 2016, it shows an 
irregular pattern by going down and up again. Like many other governments before, 
except for 1998 - 2010, Rutte – II does not have a consistently decreasing correlation. It 
is not too strange either that the Macro-economy is not coming back as a priority topic 
within the 2012 coalition agreement despite the Netherlands still reeling back from the 
2008 financial crisis. Usually during or the year after a crisis breaks out, Macro – 
economy becomes an important topic but the attention shifts throughout the following 
years to other topics due to the necessity of reforms and change being applied to the 
specific sectors and topics. This leads to a shift in attention and a change in the coding of 
the statements. This can be seen in the 2012 coalition agreement as well. When 
(economic or budgetary) reforms are mentioned, most of these are already very topic 
specific. Leading to these statements not being coded as Macro-economy but rather as 
Education or Social security. 
 Another result which shows this as well is the sum and corrected ratio. When all 
recurring topics of the speeches are added up, the sum is eight, giving Rutte – II a ratio of 
two. The sum given for the recurring coalition topics is well within the normal range 
when compared to the former agreements. With a maximum ratio of 5, this particular 
ratio would appear to be a bit on the low side, but when we look at the ratios of the 
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other coalition agreements, it is definitely not the lowest nor is it much below the total 
average of all ratios.  
Table 5: 2012 coalition agreement and corresponding executive speeches 
  
When looking again at the top 5 of the 2012 political agenda and cross-reference 
them with the top 5’s of the executive speeches table 6, I already noted earlier how the 
topic of macro-economy was missing in the coalition agreement but recurring in every 
executive speech for this period. On overall, the topic recurrence within the executive 
speeches is pretty high. There are not many changes topic wise concerning the executive 
speeches. Although, when we look at the numbers in table 6, we see some diverse 
results. For instance, 2015 and especially 2013 have greater discrepancies between the 
topics than is the case in 2014 and 2016. Especially for 2014 and 2016, the portions of 
attention are very close together. This also gives the impression that the attention 
between the topics is more evenly divided and that more topics are deemed important 
and not just a few as most important. This is not the case in 2013, with a difference of 11 
per cent between the first and the last topics, and 5 per cent in 2015, while the 
difference between the first and fifth topics are only about 2 per cent for the years 2014 
and 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 Education, Public Adm., 
Foreign policy, Justice, 
Rights 
2013 Macro, Social security, Labour, Foreign 
policy, Public Adm. 
  2014 Foreign policy, Macro, Labour, Social 
security, Health 
  2015 Macro, Foreign policy, Social security, 
Justice, Rights 
  2016 Foreign policy, Health, Labour, Justice, 
Macro 
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Table 6: Top 5 correlation for executives speeches by the Rutte – II government  
 
Highly interesting are the years when two or three topics have the same correlation or 
when they are less than 1% different from the following category. This occurs multiple 
times, meaning that the same amount of attention is given to multiple topics.  
The positions of the topics within the top 5 vary a bit as well, though it is either 
the topic of macro – economy or foreign policy at first place. What we need to take into 
account is that often when the Macro – economy is mentioned in an executive speech, 
most of the statements are often a reflection on what happened in the past and how the 
government sees improvement or stagnation of certain levels and less of what the plans 
for the upcoming year are. Also, it is not too strange that there is more focus on foreign 
policy in the executive speeches due to the function of this political agenda: whereas the 
coalition agreement is often domestically focused and detailing the policy ideas and 
campaign points a newly made government negotiated about and wrote down as their 
guideline in an unofficial contract, the executive speech puts more emphasis on the place 
and situation of the Netherlands in a regional and global perspective. That we see 
foreign policy back in the top 5 of this coalition agreement is neither too surprising 
because in the introduction of the agreement, it is specifically mentioned how reforms, 
among others in this sector, are deemed highly necessary.  
 
  
 
Year/ Top 5  1 2 3 4 5 
                  
2013 
Macro: 
19,87179 
Social Sec: 
16,66667 
Labour: 
13,46154 
Foreign 
policy: 
10,25641 
Public Adm.: 
8,333333 
2014 
Foreign 
policy: 
11,33333 
Macro: 
11,33333 
Labour: 
11,33333 
Social Sec: 
10,66667 
Health: 
9,333333 
2015 
Macro: 
14,46541 
Foreign 
policy: 
12,57862 
Social Sec: 
12,57862 
Justice: 
8,176101 
Rights: 
8,176101 
2016 
Foreign 
Policy: 
12,6506 
Health: 
12,04819 
Labour: 
12,04819 
Justice: 
10,84337 
Macro: 
10,24096 
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5 – Discussion and Conclusion 
 
5.1 – Sub-question 5: The Political Business Cycle 
 
Part of this thesis’ goal was to research the possible application of the Political Business 
Cycle in a coalition government-like structure as present in the Netherlands. So far, most 
of the research of the PBC was focused on presidential or UK parliamentary systems. So 
can we find the Political Business Cycle when looking at the given data? Does it occur in 
nations with different political systems than the nations the PBC stems from? To answer 
this question I will shortly repeat the idea of the PBC: an incumbent government will 
implement as many economic policies to maximise the possibility of a positive outcome 
at the next elections, in which both political parties and the electorate will act rationally 
and determine future voting behaviour on past experiences. In order to have a bigger 
chance of this positive outcome, incumbent parties will not only try to implement 
policies but also attempt to manipulate these in order to benefit from the results. So by 
first implementing the bitter and sour policies to leave the sweet ones for the election 
year. This would mean here that a government would prefer to start their term with a 
low correspondence and end up with a higher one in the final year(s). On average we do 
not see this back in the data. As mentioned throughout this chapter, most of the 
governments start with an average to high correlation (0.5 – 0.7) and most of the time 
end up with a lower correlation in their final year compared to what they started with. 
This so – called pattern of agenda correspondence, as the successful application of the 
PBC would show is difficult to see in the last 55 years of coalition governments in the 
Netherlands. In most cases there is a fluctuating pattern, not a clear line from low to high 
correspondence. While for instance the 1989 coalition showed this upward wave 
movement of the PBC, implicating that a Political Business Cycle was present here, this 
trend is not continued in the following cabinets before or after the 1989 government.  
 Due to the political system we have here in the Netherlands, it would be difficult 
for a government to apply the Political Business Cycle. Warwick argues how political 
parties are restricted by their policy horizons. Although a coalition should be possible on 
paper when looking at the number of seats the collaboration of these parties should 
bring together, in reality many options can often be discarded as attainable. In a nation 
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with a government structure as we have here in the Netherlands, together with our 
multitude of political parties, it might be increasingly difficult to form a majority 
government. The 2017 election results only support this argument. Whereas with the 
2012 elections there were two big parties who formed an unlikely bond, these results 
show a much more divided parliament. Warwick’s argument are visible in the 
Netherlands in the previous government as well as in the current formation process. 
Samson, the PvdA leader, often had to defend its collaboration with the VVD. These two 
parties apparently have had some policy overlap, but either not enough overlap in their 
horizons or their ideas and ways of tackling certain issues caused for a lot of friction 
between the electorate and their parties, specifically for the PvdA. It resulted in a severe 
‘punishment’ with the last elections. The correlation of this government is remarkable in 
that it breaks with the trend of a steadily decreasing correlation as started in the late 
90’s, but also because all years are of an extremely low correlation. The highest 
correlation for Rutte-II is just below the average, and although the other cabinets did not 
have higher correlations for all the years, since 1967 there has not been one government 
with a highest correlation that is so little. 
Even when a coalition is formed of more closely aligned parties, these are still 
different political parties and as a result still differ in their views about how to behave 
and will in all likelihood have different ideas about the course which needs to be taken.  
We only have to look at the current formation process to see Warwick’s policy horizons 
in action. Despite the political parties involved in the formation discussions are 
considered to be more closely aligned on the political scale than the former government, 
some of them differ significantly on issues important to them or their constituency. This 
will lead to a disunited front which in result will make it more difficult to plan 
(economic) policies yielding beneficial results for all incumbent parties in the next 
elections.  
While Nordhaus (1975) has a valid argument that the electorate votes rationally 
and bases this on past behaviour, the number of political parties taking part in the 
elections makes it also difficult for these political parties to maximise their rational 
capabilities as much as they would prefer. Furthermore, the theory of the Political 
Business Cycle leaves little space for new political parties because there is little to no 
previous experience for voters to base their voting behaviour on. Last elections in the 
Netherlands showed that this is not consequently a big issue for some Dutch voters, 
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seeing how two newly formed political parties gained multiple seats in the House of 
Representatives.    
 As Schulz (1995) has argued, Nordhaus’ PBC theory is too simplified because the 
situation in which a nation is at that moment, does not need to occur again nor exactly 
like before, so systematically holding on to a certain path can prove dangerous for a 
political party as well as that the need of a government might change throughout the 
years. As I said earlier, the PBC theory does not account for the effects smaller parties 
may have and their chance to win seats. An explanation for this is that such a thing does 
not often happen in the UK or US, but it does happen in the Netherlands. I agree with 
Minford and Peel (1982) that while a voter is influenced to a certain extent with regard 
to his or her voting behaviour, the actual manipulation of the political parties is limited 
because if voters behave rationally, they would also see through this manipulative 
behaviour. Media presence and coverage of politicians influence voting behaviour as 
well, same as how issues deemed important by the voters are represented by the 
political parties. But that voters do want to cast their vote based on rational thought was 
shown with the polls during last elections: about 2/3 of the voters was still unsure who 
to vote for about two weeks before the election. Leading to believe that decision making 
is not easy while many people did take it seriously when taking into account the high 
voter turnout. The multitude of parties did not make the decision for most of the 
electorate any easier nor did reflection on the past behaviour of the existing political 
parties make it any easier to decide early on who to vote for. It is possibly interesting to 
look into what made it more difficult for people to choose who to vote for. Was it 
connected to the growing number of parties and the wish for more alternative or new 
options but unsure of these due to no past experiences to compare and contrast with or 
the growing number of issues deemed important? 
To answer the fifth and final sub-question Did cabinet Rutte-II and previous 
cabinets make use of the Political Business Cycle, I look specifically at the attention 
allocation of both political agendas and the correlation of Rutte-II, and it would be 
difficult to point out a strong PBC. Although there are some differences between the top 
5 in topics of both political agendas, the attention allocation is not that diverse nor are 
there wide margins between the topics. Additionally, it is hard to point out strong 
differences between the topics regarding their attention allocation and there is no larger 
focus on the Macro – Economy after the first year when there was the biggest difference 
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between that category and the rest of the topics. Last election also showed us that the 
economy was not the most important topic of the campaigns. Attention was given to 
how this government improved the situation after the financial crisis, but it was also 
specifically focused on topics such as the environment, healthcare, pensions etc. The 
focus has shifted from a few policy issues to a multitude of issues or the specifics of 
these issues. Another observation shows that the PBC or its effects are limited because 
some of the established parties lost a significant number of seats in comparison to 
before, including the Rutte – II coalition parties. This does not mean that voters did not 
act rationally. Different factors such as national, regional or global events and the 
government’s reaction to it could have affected their behaviour. As well as 
disappointment with the taken course or having made the (un)rational decision to vote 
outside of the political establishment. So even if the PBC was present to a certain extent 
in the Netherlands, these last elections showed that the effects of it were slim to non-
existent. The PBC means that governments will time the proposal and implementation of 
policies on their agendas to maximise the positive effects. Looking at the data, it is clear 
that the governments, not only Rutte-II, have been unsuccessful in timing policy 
proposals to such an extent that it ultimately did not lead to significant higher 
correlations in their final years. 
 
5.2 – Hypothesis and main research question 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is:  
 
H1:  Instead of following the pattern found in previous research the Rutte-II 
government has broken with this pattern while the Political Business Cycle did 
not influence the political agenda. 
 
This hypothesis proves to be partially true. It is clear that the attention allocation trend 
as discovered in earlier research is not present in the attention allocation of the Rutte-II 
government. Seeing that the Rutte-II government shows a fluctuating correlation and 
does not end with an extremely high correlation but actually below the total average, it 
can be said that neither does the Rutte-II government stick to the trend of starting with a 
low and ultimately ending with a high correlation, nor with the trend started in the late 
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90’s of a decreasing correlation throughout the years. Regarding the second part of the 
hypothesis about the Political Business Cycle, I conclude this to be correct due to the fact 
that the PBC could not have any effect on the political agenda because the data does not 
show any clear signs that the Political Business Cycle has been present in the 
Netherlands in the first place.  
 In order to answer the main research question of this thesis: 
 
To what extent did the Rutte-II government stick to the allocation of attention to policy 
problems as decided upon in the coalition agreement and what is the influence of the 
Political Business Cycle? 
 
The Rutte-II government did not stick very thoroughly to the attention allocation as set 
out in the coalition agreement. The data in Chapter 4 shows us, and what I argued earlier 
in this chapter,  that this government has a remarkable low correlation. Therefore I 
judge that the Rutte-II government only marginally stuck to the attention allocation of 
the coalition agreement. In comparison to the Rutte-I government it did very well, but 
when compared to the years before 2010, it scores exceptionally low. Based on the 
overall data the PBC was not present or not very effective for the entire observed period, 
not solely in the last few years. This is a trend (no effective or strong PBC) which is 
continued with the Rutte – II government because although ending up higher than its 
starting year, it fluctuates throughout and the correlation is not even the highest one for 
Rutte – II in that period. Moreover, the manifestation of the Political Business Cycle 
would only be possible when the data shows correlation which not only differ, but also 
differ ranging from low to high within the same government. Seeing how the 
correlations do differ but fluctuate, I  therefore conclude that the Political Business Cycle 
is not present currently and has not been present in the past in the Netherlands.  
Political parties appear to be unable to yield particular benefits from the PBC or 
have difficulty implementing these positive policies due to the nature of Dutch 
governments: coalition cabinets. Even political parties in the same policy horizon, as 
Warwick names it, have their different opinion on what to implement and in what way. 
That some ultimately do yield  more benefits from these policies can be found when a 
political party does return in the consecutive government, especially with the same 
prime minister. Nevertheless, if a political party does not return or is not part of the new 
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government, it does not mean necessarily that they ‘lost’. There are multiple reasons for 
these political parties to not be or no longer be part of the government. Possibly the 
relationship between the former governing parties was not working as well as was 
hoped for so they decided not to continue the ‘romance’, it could be that the ‘winning’ 
parties are too far apart on the political scale to even have successful formation talks or 
for other parties objecting to another’s participation. The same as that a small party can 
still be part of a coalition as Dutch coalition history has shown. Thus, the application of 
the Political Business Cycle has not happened so far and I deem it also extremely difficult 
and unlikely it will be used (successfully) in the Dutch case because of the nature of our 
political system with often not simply one clear ‘winner’ or ‘loser’. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – List of Main Categories 
 
1. Macro-economy and taxes 
2. Civil rights, immigration and integration 
3. Healthcare 
4. Agriculture and fisheries 
5. Labour 
6. Education and culture 
7. Environment 
8. Energy 
10. Traffic and transport 
12. Law/justice, court rulings, crime  
13. Social affairs 
14. Housing and city planning 
15. Business, national trade and commerce 
16. Defense 
17. Scientific research, technology, and communication 
18.  Foreign trade 
19. Foreign affairs and foreign aid 
20. Public Administration 
21. Spatial planning, public nature and water conservation 
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Appendix B – Plots Attention Allocation Coalition Agreement 1963-
2012 
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